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Targeted immunization or attacks of large-scale networks has attracted significant attention by the
scientific community. However, in real-world scenarios, knowledge and observations of the network
may be limited thereby precluding a full assessment of the optimal nodes to immunize (or remove)
in order to avoid epidemic spreading such as that of current COVID-19 epidemic. Here, we study
a novel immunization strategy where only n nodes are observed at a time and the most central
between these n nodes is immunized (or attacked). This process is continued repeatedly until
1 − p fraction of nodes are immunized (or attacked). We develop an analytical framework for this
approach and determine the critical percolation threshold pc and the size of the giant component P∞
for networks with arbitrary degree distributions P (k). In the limit of n→∞ we recover prior work
on targeted attack, whereas for n = 1 we recover the known case of random failure. Between these
two extremes, we observe that as n increases, pc increases quickly towards its optimal value under
targeted immunization (attack) with complete information. In particular, we find a new scaling
relationship between |pc(∞)− pc(n)| and n as |pc(∞)− pc(n)| ∼ n−1 exp(−αn). For Scale-free (SF)
networks, where P (k) ∼ k−γ , 2 < γ < 3, we find that pc has a transition from zero to non-zero
when n increases from n = 1 to order of logN (N is the size of network). Thus, for SF networks,
knowledge of order of logN nodes and immunizing them can reduce dramatically an epidemics.
Networks play a crucial role in many diverse systems
[1–8]. Connectivity of components is critical for main-
taining the functioning of infrastructures like the inter-
net [9] and transportation networks [10], as well as for
understanding immunization against epidemics [11] and
the spread of information in social systems [12]. Due to
this importance, researchers have long focused on how
a network can be optimally immunized or fragmented to
prevent epidemics or to maintain infrastructure resilience
[3, 13–17]. Many approaches have used percolation the-
ory from statistical physics to prevent the spread of virus
or assess network resilience under the infection or failure
of some fraction of nodes or links [18–28].
Early studies in networks found that immunizing real
networks against an epidemic is highly challenging due
to the existence of hubs which prevent eradication of the
virus even if many nodes are immunized [29–31]. At the
same time, if these hub nodes, largest degree nodes, are
targeted, the network can reach immunity [29, 31, 32].
However, these previous models of targeted immuniza-
tion have assumed full knowledge of the network struc-
ture which in many cases is not available. Recent re-
search has shown that even those in control of a network
often have knowledge only of a small part of the whole
network structure [33–35]. This was particularly demon-
strated with the current COVID-19 epidemic where the
detailed social network of individuals is unknown.
In this Letter, we study targeted immunization or re-
moval in networks with limited knowledge. We assume
that at each stage, a number n nodes are observed and
the node with highest degree is immunized and thus un-
able to continue spreading infection. This procedure is
repeated until 1− p fraction of nodes are immunized. In
particular, our model could apply to a situation where
several cooperative teams are sent to immunize a net-
work and each team has access to information on a small
subset (n nodes) of the network. We develop a theoretical
framework for this model of immunization with limited
information using percolation theory for networks with
arbitrary degree distribution. In the limit of n = N we
recover prior work on targeted attack [32], whereas for
n = 1 we recover the case of random failure [30, 31]. We
observe excellent agreement between our theoretical and
simulation results for the n dependence of the critical
threshold pc and the size of the giant component P∞ for
p > pc. The giant component and pc characterize the
efficiency of the immunization. The smaller is the giant
component, the immunization strategy is better. The
larger is pc the immunization is more efficient since less
immunization doses are needed to stop the epidemics. We
find an analytical relationship between n and pc for both
Erdo˝s-Re´nyi (ER) and Scale-Free (SF) networks. Sur-
prisingly, we also find that pc quickly reaches a plateau
even for relatively small n, after which increasing n has
negligible effect on pc. This means that immunization
with small n (not knowing the whole structure) can dra-
matically improve the immunization.
Let G(V,E) be a network where V and E are the set
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FIG. 1. Schematic illustration of our limited knowledge im-
munization or attack strategy. The preventer or attacker is
able to observe the degree of nodes that are colored green,
while the gray nodes are unknown. (a) For the classical tar-
geted immunization (attack), one has complete information
on the global structure of the network and chooses the highest
degree node (u) to immunize (remove). (b) Here the case of
an individual with limited knowledge of the network is demon-
strated. In this figure, we set n = 3 and only degrees of nodes
v1, v2 and v3 are known. Given this limited information, the
preventer would choose to immunize v3, being unaware that
an unobserved higher degree node exists. At the next immu-
nization or attack, only nodes which have not been immunized
or removed yet will be observed.
of nodes and edges, respectively. N = |V | is the num-
ber of nodes in the network. We assume that a preven-
ter or attacker has limited knowledge of the overall net-
work structure and instead possesses only limited infor-
mation on several nodes. Specifically, we randomly select
n nodes for which the preventer or attacker is assumed
to have information on the node degree. The preventer
or attacker then targets the node with the highest degree
among these n. This procedure is then repeated until a
1 − p fraction of nodes are immunized or removed from
the network.
In Fig.1, the limited information immunization (at-
tack) is illustrated together with global targeted immu-
nization on a network. Here a total of n = 3 nodes are
observed. In panel (a), an individual with global infor-
mation about the network structure chooses the highest
degree node u to immunize (or remove). However, in
panel (b), the individual only knows at a time the degree
of 3 nodes in the network, i.e. v1, v2, v3. Consequently,
node v3 with the highest degree k = 4 (marked in red) is
immunized (or removed).
Suppose the degree distribution of a network is given
by P (k) and F (k) =
∑k
s=0 P (s) being the cumulative
probability that the degree of a randomly chosen node is
less than or equal to k. Furthermore, at an arbitrary time
t during the iterative percolation process, assume the dis-
tribution of the original degree (including the immunized
neighbors) of the remaining nodes is P (k, t). Then, the
degree distribution of the node which is immunized at
time t is given by
Pr(k, t) = F (k, t)
n − F (k − 1, t)n ≡ ∆ [F (k, t)n] , (1)
where F (k, t) is the cumulative distribution of P (k, t).
This formula can be recognized as being derived from
order statistics giving the maximum of several indepen-
dent random variables [36]. For k = 0, Eq. (1) becomes
Pr(0, t) = F (0, t)
n. Hence we define F (k − 1, t) = 0, and
then Eq. (1) is valid for k ≥ 0.
In a limited knowledge immunization or attack, each
node’s immunization changes the degree distribution of
the remaining nodes in the following way
N(k, t+ 1) = N(k, t)− Pr(k, t), (2)
where N(k, t) is the number of nodes with degree k at
time t, and Pr(k, t) is the likelihood that a node immu-
nized at time t has a degree k.
Then, plugging Eq. (1) into Eq. (2) gives,
N(k, t+ 1) = N(k, t)−∆ [F (k, t)n] ,
which becomes in the continuous limit,
∂N(k, t)
∂t
= −∆ [F (k, t)n] .
Substituting N(k, t) = (N − t)P (k, t), we get
−P (k, t) + (N − t)∂P (k, t)
∂t
= −∆ [F (k, t)n] ,
and using P (k, t) = ∆F (k, t), we obtain,
∆
[
−F (k, t) + (N − t)∂F (k, t)
∂t
+ F (k, t)n
]
= 0.
Note that F (k = −1, t) = 0, and thus the entire term
inside the ∆ is 0 for k = −1. Similarly, this implies that
for k = 0 and likewise for any k ≥ 0 this term is also
0. Thus, we get the following simple ordinary differential
equation,
(N − t) ∂
∂t
F (k, t) = F (k, t)− F (k, t)n, (3)
with the initial condition F (k, t = 0) = F (k). It can be
shown (see Sec I in SM) that the solution of this ODE,
Eq. (3) is
F (k, t) =
(
1 +
(
F (k)1−n − 1)e(n−1) log[(N−t)/N ])− 1n−1 ,
(4)
or equivalently,
Fp(k) =
(
1 +
(
F (k)1−n − 1) pn−1)− 1n−1 , (5)
where Fp(k) is the cumulative distribution of the degree
after immunizing (removing) 1− p fraction of nodes. For
3n = 1, the solution of Eq. (3) is Fp(k) = F (k) as ex-
pected. Also Eq. (5) converges to F (k) in the limit n→ 1.
We can now obtain the degree distribution of the oc-
cupied nodes after fraction 1 − p nodes are immunized,
which is given by
Pp(k) = ∆Fp(k) = Fp(k)− Fp(k − 1). (6)
The equation for v, the probability of a randomly chosen
link to lead to a node not in the giant component, is
1− v =
∞∑
k=0
kP (k)
〈k〉 P (Θ|k)(1− v
k−1), (7)
where P (Θ|k) is the probability of a node to be occupied
given its degree is k. Using Bayes Theorem, we note that
P (k)P (Θ|k) = P (Θ)P (k|Θ) = pPp(k). Hence Eq. (7)
becomes
1− v = p〈k〉
∞∑
k=0
kPp(k)(1− vk−1). (8)
The giant component S can be found by
S =
∞∑
k=0
P (k)P (Θ|k)(1− vk) = p
∞∑
k=0
Pp(k)(1− vk), (9)
where v is found from Eq. (8).
At criticality, we take the derivative of both sides of
Eq. (8) and substitute v = 1 representing the location
where the first solution with v < 1 exists, as opposed to
only the v = 1 solution. Thus, the critical condition is
1 =
pc
〈k〉
∞∑
k=0
k(k − 1)Ppc(k). (10)
We now study our limited knowledge immunization
(attack) strategy, i.e., the general result, Eqs. (8) and
(9), on ER networks. First, we analyze the giant com-
ponent P∞. For the case n = 1, limited knowledge im-
munization (or attack) reduces to the classical random
attack, while for n→∞ (meaning the global network is
observed) corresponds to targeted attack [14, 29, 31, 32].
Using Eq. (9), the giant component P∞ can be solved
numerically for any given p. In Fig. 2(a), simulations
and analytic results are shown for the giant component
P∞ as a function of 1− p under limited information im-
munization with different n. As the knowledge index n
increases from 1 to N , limited knowledge immunization
moves from being like random immunization (attack) to
being like targeted immunization (attack). The simu-
lations are in excellent agreement with the theoretical
results (lines).
Next, we focus on the critical threshold, pc, of lim-
ited knowledge immunization (attack). Overall, we find
that one does not need a very large knowledge n ∼ 10
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FIG. 2. Results on ER networks. (a) The giant component
P∞ of an ER network with 〈k〉 = 4 varies with the fraction
of immunized (or removed) nodes 1− p under limited knowl-
edge. As the n is increased, limited knowledge immunization
tends to have the same immunization effect as targeted immu-
nization. (b) The critical threshold pc of limited knowledge
immunization as a function of n on ER networks. Note that
already for small n ∼ 10, pc is close to targeted immuniza-
tion (global knowledge, n ∼ N). (c) Critical threshold pc
as a function the mean degree 〈k〉 of ER networks for lim-
ited knowledge immunization. (d) The scaling of |pc(∞)−pc|
with n on ER networks. Symbols are average results of sim-
ulations over 100 independent realizations on ER networks
with 106 nodes. All simulation results (symbols) agree well
with theoretical results from Eq. (10) (dashed lines).
to achieve nearly the very close effect as targeted immu-
nization (attack) with complete information. This can be
seen by observing the critical threshold pc as a function
of n in Fig. 2(b). In Fig. 2(c) we show the variation of
pc with 〈k〉 for several fixed n.
Next, the behavior of pc in the limit of large n is derived
analytically. By examining Eq. (5) we notice that when
n → ∞ there are two distinct behaviors depending on
whether k is small, F (k) < p; or k is large, F (k) > p. It
can be shown (see Sec II in SM) that the leading term
behaves as,
Fp(k) ∼

F (k)
p − 1ne−αkn, F (k) < p
1− 1ne−αkn, p < F (k) < 1
1, F (k) = 1
(11)
where αk = |log [p/F (k)]|. In the limit n → ∞, we can
get the expected result for targeted immunization (at-
tack), Fp(k) = min {F (k)/p, 1} [31, 32].
Plugging Eq. (11) into Eq. (10), and noting that from
a sum of exponentials decaying with n only the lowest
decay rate contributes to the leading term, we obtain
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FIG. 3. Results for SF networks. Comparison of theory (lines)
and simulation (symbols) for limited knowledge immunization
or attack, n, for SF networks. (a) The size of the giant com-
ponent versus n for SF network with γ = 2.5. (b) Critical
threshold pc versus n on SF networks. Simulations are ob-
tained for a system with 106 nodes and averaged over 100
independent realizations. The minimum and maximum de-
gree of network are m = 2 and K = 1000 respectively.
(see Sec II in SM)
pc(n) ∼ p∞c −A
1
n
e−αn, (12)
where p∞c = pc(n→∞), and the decay rate α is now
α = min
k
|log (p∞c /F (k))| .
The pre-factor A = (2p∞c kslow)/(k>k<), where k< is the
largest degree such that F (k) < p∞c , k> = k< + 1 and
kslow is the degree which gives the lowest rate α. (See
illustration in SM).
It is clear that kslow must be k< or k> because F (k) is
monotonic. If F (kslow) = F (k>) = 1 then k< should be
taken as kslow, and the corresponding α should be taken.
It should also be noted that if kslow is not unique, it would
simply change the pre-factor A in Eq. (12). Another
special case is where F (kslow) = p
∞
c , then |p∞c −pc| ∼ 1/n
(see Sec IV in SM).
Fig. 2(d) shows ∆pc = |p∞c −pc| as a function of n. As
expected from the theory, one can see that ∆pc ∼ 1/n for
small n and exponential decay for large n. When pc → 1
which occurs for ER network when 〈k〉 → 1, the power
law regime becomes much broader as explained in the
Sec II of SM.
Next, we study SF networks with P (k) = Ak−γ , k =
m, · · · ,K, where A = (γ − 1)mγ−1 is the normalization
factor, and m and K are the minimum and maximum
degree respectively [30]. Similar to ER networks, the
size of the giant component, P∞ can be obtained from
Eq. (9). Fig. 3(a), shows P∞ as a function of 1 − p
for different n values. The results demonstrate that SF
networks become more immunized/vulnerable compared
to ER networks under the immunization/attack as n in-
creases. Compared with ER networks, one can observe
that slightly higher values of n (more knowledge) are
needed to reach the near-steady-state region of fully tar-
geted strategy.
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FIG. 4. How pc for SF networks depends on γ and the system
sizeN . (a) pc as a function of γ for different values of n andN .
pc decreases with increasing N . For n = 1 and 2 < γ < 3, it
is well-known that pc approaches zero for infinite system. (b)
pc as a function of n/ logN for SF network with γ = 2.1. The
enlarged figure for small n = 1, · · · , 5 are shown in the inset,
and pc approaches zero for n/ logN  1. (c) The scaling of
pc with N and n for large N and small n. Here C(n) is the
pre-factor. The minimum and maximum degree of nodes are
m = 2 and K = N1/(γ−1) respectively. This confirms Eq. (14)
for γ = 2.1, and δ = (3− γ)/2 = 0.45.
For SF networks with 2 < γ < 3, under random immu-
nization/attack (n = 1), it has been shown that pc = 0
for an infinite system [30], while for high-degree immu-
nization/attack (n→∞), pc > 0 [31, 32]. Next we wish
to find out for which n, pc becomes non-zero, and how it
depends on the system size N . To this end, we analyze
Eqs. (5) and (10) for large k (high degrees govern the
behavior in SF), small n and p as follows (elaborated in
SM).
It can be shown that for large degrees,
F (k) ≈ 1− (k/m)1−γ .
Substituting this into Eq. (5) and assuming (k/m)γ−1 
n for large degrees, it can be concluded that
Pp(k) ≈ ∂Fp(k)
∂k
≈ pn−1P (k). (13)
In addition, we notice that Pp(k) has a new natural cut-
off, Kp, which depends on p and N as follows (see Sec III
in SM),
Kp ∼ pn/(γ−1)N1/(γ−1).
This helps us to evaluate the second moment of Pp(k)
〈k2p〉 ∼
Kp∫
m
k2pn−1Ak−γ ∼ pn−1Kp3−γ ∼ pn−1+nβNβ ,
5where β = (3− γ)/(γ − 1).
Considering this, and plugging Eq. (13) into Eq. (10),
and keeping the leading terms in the limit of large N , we
obtain (see Sec III in SM for more details)
pc ∼ C(n)N−δ/n ∼ C(n) exp
[
−δ logN
n
]
, (14)
where
δ =
β
1 + β
=
3− γ
2
.
From Eq. (14), it is easy to see that if n  logN
then pc → 0, while if n ∼ logN then pc is non-zero. The
pre-factor C(n) depends on n but not in N .
Fig. 4(a) shows pc versus γ. It is known that for
2 < γ < 3 and n = 1, if N → ∞ then pc → 0 [30].
Also for n = 5, we can see that system size matters and
pc decreases as N increases. Fig. 4(b) shows that the
scaling with n/ logN of Eq. (14) is valid. Furthermore, it
is seen in Fig. 4(b) that when n is small orN is large, such
that n/ logN  1 (in Fig. 4 it is 0.07), pc approaches 0.
Fig. 4(c) supports the exponential scaling of pc versus
n−1 logN obtained analytically in Eq. (14).
In summary, our results provide a framework for un-
derstanding and carrying out efficient immunization with
limited knowledge. Especially in cases of global pan-
demics such as e.g., the current COVID-19, it is impossi-
ble to know the full interactions of all individuals. Thus
an effective way to limit spreading is obtaining informa-
tion on a few (n) individuals and targeting the most cen-
tral of these. For example, testers could stand at a su-
permarket and select a group of people entering the store
simultaneously. Information on the connections of these
people e.g., the number of people they live with, where
and how often they meet with other people etc. could be
quickly obtained (such as through cell phone tracking)
and then the individual with the most connections in the
group could be quarantined or immunized. Our results
demonstrate that even when this is done in small groups
of people (low n), it is possible to obtain a significant
improvement in global immunization compared to ran-
domly selecting individuals. In our model, this was seen
by the reduced size of the giant component and the large
critical threshold pc. Overall, these findings could help to
develop better ways for immunizing large networks and
designing resilient infrastructure.
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